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Abstract:  This paper examines the role of reinsurance relationships in the trading of
underwriting risk when this trade takes place in an environment that is characterized by
asymmetric information and in which information is revealed only over time. It begins by
explaining how information problems affect the efficiency of the allocation of risk between
insurer and reinsurer, and how long-term implicit contracts between insurers and reinsurers
allow the inclusion of new information in the pricing of both future and past reinsurance
coverage. Because of these features, the ceding company purchases a more efficient quantity
of reinsurance. Specifically, such arrangements lead to more reinsurance coverage, higher
insurer profits, and lower expected distress in the industry. It is, in short, Pareto improving.1
1  Introduction
The capacity of the insurance industry to absorb large losses resulting from natural
disasters has been severely tested in the 1990’s and has caused concern among
practitioners and policymakers. Although partly due to the growth in insured property
values, the unprecedented scale of the losses caused by catastrophic events such as
hurricanes and earthquakes in this decade has led to a re-assessment of commonly held
beliefs about the frequency and magnitude of these phenomena.
1 It has also sparked
interest in a better understanding of current risk-sharing arrangements within the industry
as well as the relative effectiveness of markets for sharing catastrophic risks with the
wider community of investors. Traditionally, private reinsurance contracts whereby an
insurer cedes part of the original risk to a reinsurer, have been used to share risk within
the insurance industry. This study analyzes the nature of these risk sharing contracts.
Most analyses of these contracts up to this point have emphasized their ability to pool
capacity: reinsurance effectively transforms the insurance industry into one big insurer
whose capacity is the sum of the capacities of individual insurers. This literature
pioneered by Borch (1962) and developed by many others
2, predicts that in equilibrium,
all insurers’ portfolios are perfectly correlated after reinsurance is taken into account.
While this literature has significantly contributed to our understanding of reinsurance, it
does have limiting assumptions which warrant consideration.
First, in these models both insurers and reinsurers have the same information set. In
reality, this may not be true. As insurance underwriters have first hand information
concerning the nature and extent of the vulnerability one would suspect that they are
better informed than their reinsurance counterparts.  In the case of natural catastrophes, it
may seem reasonable to assume that both insurer and reinsurer are equally informed
about the frequency of losses. However, even in this case, insurers control the
relationship with the insured and are likely to have private information about the
magnitude of potential losses, which depends on factors that are more easily observed by
the insurer such as the adequacy of mitigation measures.  Even in this case, reinsurance
may reduce the insurer’s incentives to expend resources to identify policyholders with
low expected losses. In effect, risk sharing may result in a deterioration of the quality of
underwriting standards.  If this deterioration is severe enough, it may actually increase
the industry’s vulnerability to catastrophic events.
Second, most analyses are developed in a static, one-period framework. In contrast,
reinsurance is characterized by an intimate long-term relationship between insurer and
reinsurer.
3 Some elements of this relationship are explicitly stated in contractual
provisions but others are tacit agreements. The value of reinsurance may lie in the nature
of this intertemporal relationship and its resulting effect on the market’s ability to deal
with monitoring and verification issues. These features cannot be captured in one-period
models that essentially treat reinsurance as a onetime arm’s length transaction.
                                                       
1 See Cummins, Lewis and Phillips (1996)
2 For instance Cummins and Doherty (1998)
3 See Ferguson (1980)2
This paper examines the role of reinsurance relationships in the trading of underwriting
risk when this trade takes place in an environment that is characterized by asymmetric
information and in which information is revealed only over time. It starts with the
observation that each layer of the transaction introduces asymmetric information. First, at
the origination level, the insured is likely to be better informed about the risk of loss from
catastrophic events for which it is purchasing insurance from the primary insurer. Second,
the insurer itself has more information about and control of the risk being ceded than the
reinsurer. Finally, the reinsurer may have an information advantage over capital markets
because of its ability to audit and monitor the insurer. This pyramid of asymmetric
information limits the ability of reinsurance to yield the optimal allocation of risk.
The model considers a risk-neutral world in which the demand for reinsurance is created
by the existence of bankruptcy costs. Although both insurer and reinsurer face the same
capital markets and incur substantial costs in financial distress, the reinsurer usually has
better diversification opportunities, which may lower its expected bankruptcy costs. This
implies that the cost of taking on an additional risk is higher for the primary insurer than
for the reinsurer. However, because reinsurers are less informed about the quality of the
risks they are assuming, their evaluation of their risk of insolvency is not accurate; this
distorts their pricing of reinsurance. In response to this information asymmetry, the
quantity of reinsurance that is demanded by insurers is not first-best. However, because
the reinsurer learns the insurer’s expected losses in the course of the relationship, the
pricing accuracy improves over time. This has one clear and interesting effect, insurers
purchase more reinsurance as the expected length of the relationship increases. This is the
case because as information arrives, the reinsurance premium is likely to decline, because
it will reflect expected losses more accurately.
Although reinsurance is primarily used to share the risk from the liabilities of the insurer,
there are other factors that affect the demand for reinsurance and these will not be
considered here. These omitted factors can broadly be classified into three categories.
One advantage of reinsurance is that it allows the primary insurer to tap the reinsurer’s
expertise while keeping control of the valuable relationship with the insured. For
instance, although the primary insurer may specialize in a particular line, it may use
reinsurance to offer its customers a wider diversity of products.
4 The demand for
reinsurance is also affected by regulatory accounting constraints that determine the
insurer’s underwriting capacity. In this context, reinsurance allows the primary insurer to
strengthen its financial structure, stabilize its earnings and alter its regulatory capital.
5
Finally, the demand for reinsurance can be dictated by tax considerations. Reinsurance
can be used as a mechanism to transfer tax shields benefits to those insurers that have the
greatest capacity for utilizing them.
6 None of these ancillary characteristics of reinsurance
are modeled here. Rather, its role in risk pooling and the difficulty associated with the
                                                       
4 Reinsurance can be tied to other services; this is the “real service” purpose of reinsurance. See Baker
(1980).
5 See Strain (1980)
6  See Garven and Loubergé (1996), Cummins and Grace (1994), Mayers and Smith (1990)3
asymmetric information environment that is an unavoidable part of the market are the
focal point of the current analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the contracting
environment when risk is traded repeatedly. With repeated transactions long-term
relationships can develop; because of this feature the present  framework is suitable to the
analysis of the effect of contractual arrangements on the demand for reinsurance. This
section also formalizes the reasons for the reinsurer’s lower bankruptcy cost and analyzes
the effect of learning in the pricing of reinsurance. Section 3 analyzes risk-trading and the
optimal quantity of reinsurance under different contractual possibilities in a one-shot
model. Sections 4 and 5 extend this analysis to a dynamic setting, first with infinitely
lived agents, then within a multi period finite setting.  Section 6 summarizes our findings,
indicating the importance of our informational setting to understanding the reinsurance
market and pointing to areas of fruitful future research.
2  A Dynamic reinsurance model
2.1 The primary insurer's problem
Consider an economy in which risk-sharing takes place over several (and possibly an
infinity of ) discrete time periods. At the beginning of period t (date t-1) the insurer
collects revenue Pt-1 for the coverage that it provides its clients. Total losses for each
period are realized at the end of the period and can be thought of as independent draws
from the distribution of the random variable
e + m = ~ ~
X ) , 0 ( ~ 2 s ” e N .
In other words, losses at date t (noted Xt) are independent realizations of  X
~
and can be
thought of as random variables 
t
X ~ such that
t t
X e + m = ~ ~




e ~ are independently and identically distributed, i.i.d., random variables. In this
expression  e ~is a random variable that is beyond the insurer's control; noise variables in
different periods are independent of each other. The parameter m is characteristic of the
insurer's exposure to catastrophic losses. m can be interpreted as the result of the insurer's
previous decisions relating to selecting the risks that it wants to insure. For instance, the
insurer may investigate the adequacy of building codes as well as the degree of
enforcement of these codes in the area where it operates. Such screening activities are
costly and higher levels of expenditure on screening result in better quality of
underwriting and lower average losses from subsequent loss events. This screening
process is not specifically modeled here; it is simply assumed that at the beginning of the4
analysis screening related costs have been sunk once and for all. The intrinsic quality of
the insurer's operations is represented by the parameter m.
In any period, in addition to the losses themselves, the insurer incurs an additional cost
that can be interpreted as the cost of a higher likelihood of insolvency. The existence of
these non-linear costs across the range of loss states essentially transform insurers into
risk-averse agents that are interested in both the expected magnitude of losses and their
variability. In this case, the volatility of losses is a variable that the insurer can choose by
adjusting the level of reinsurance. This justification for reinsurance is well-known in the
literature on financial risk management.
7 The specification of the insurer’s objective
function that is adopted in this article includes a term related to actual losses as a proxy
for the cost of insolvency and the reinsurer’s distaste for risk. This approach is well
established in the literature.
8 More specifically if Lt represents the share of date t losses
that the insurer is responsible for (Lt£Xt since the insurer can reinsure) the insurer’s cost




R with  R>0
where R converts the square of the loss rate to the cost of such losses to the insurer.  As
such, it includes such things as the actual increasing firm level costs to such losses, the
increased capital market scrutiny and the likely regulatory pressure associated with such
outcomes.  It is the insurers concern over such distress costs that leads it to consider risk
transfer through reinsurance.
2.2 The reinsurer's problem
If the insurer reinsures its portfolio each period, it pays a reinsurance premium 
t
p ,
} 1 , 0 { ˛ t at the beginning of each period. At the outset, the reinsurer cannot directly
observe the parameter m. However, at date 0, the reinsurer can inspect the insurer’s
operations and learn the realization of a signal, a ~ , of the quality of the insurer’s
operations before determining the premium structure:
0
~ ~ e + m = a ) , 0 ( ~ 2
0 0
s ” e N .
                                                       
7 See Santomero (1995) and Allen and Santomero (1997)
8 See Doherty 1991 and Niehaus and Mann (1992)5
Note that the observation of a ~  is a noisy signal of m and is presumed to differ by an
unbiased error term.
It will be further assumed that reinsurance markets are competitive and insurers have all
the bargaining power.  While this assumption is made for convenience, it insures that the
reinsurance premium is always equal to the expected cost to the reinsurer. The sequence
of events is then summarized in Figure 1.
2.3  The reinsurer’s cost function
Similar to  the primary insurer, the reinsurer is susceptible to bankruptcy and the form of
its value function is the same as that of an insurer. However, the reinsurer deals with
several primary insurers, and to the extent that the losses of these insurers are not
perfectly correlated the reinsurer's operations will in general be less risky and its cost of
bankruptcy lower than that of any single insurer.
To fix these ideas, consider the following example: the reinsurer insures a fraction s of
the portfolios of each of n‡2 insurers whose losses are i.i.d. N(m,s). Further, assume that
there is zero correlation across losses for ease of analysis. Then, expected losses for the
reinsurer, are nsm and expected losses for each insurer are (1-s)m. Suppose further that the





R . Here, L represents the part of the losses for which the firm is responsible,
i.e., L=(1-s)Xi for insurer i and L=s￿Xi for the reinsurer, and the coefficient of the
quadratic term is the same for every firm in the market. This is equivalent to arguing that
both insurers and reinsurers are evaluated by the same capital market and have similar
distress costs, conditional on a proportional loss value.
























































- Reinsurance contract is signed
- Reinsurer observes signal and set
  premium
- Period t losses are realized and all
  claims are settled
- Reinsurer sets premium for period t+1
- Period T losses realized and all
  claims are settled
- Insurer-reinsurer relationship ends
Figure 1. Sequence of events6
Using this notation for the losses experienced by the insurer, the expected cost of
bankruptcy of each insurer indicated above can be written in equivalent form as:
















Notice that this illustrates both the similarity between insurers and reinsurers in this setup
and the unique value of the reinsurer spotlighted by Cummins and Doherty (1998). In
addition to the distress cost factor R/2, the generalized cost of bankruptcy for all insurers
can be decomposed into two other factors. The first factor is due to size and is equal to
(ns)
2  for the reinsurer and to (1-s)
2 for the insurers. The second factor is due to risk and is










for the reinsurer and to  ) (
2 2 m + s  for the insurers. Obviously, the
latter factor will be smaller for the reinsurer than for individual insurers. Given equal
size, i.e. ns=(1-s), the total cost of the reinsurer is smaller than that of each insurer.
Therefore, the cost factor of the reinsurer can be denoted as







= n r .
Note that when m=0 or when the cost function is changed to 




-  we have
r=1/n. This result is simply an application of the law of large numbers. In the rest of the
paper it will be assumed that the value function of the reinsurer is identical to that of an
insurer, except for the coefficient of the quadratic term which will be equal to  R R < .
2.4  Learning in the reinsurance relationship
Because the reinsurer does not observe either the initial cost incurred by the insurer to
screen its customers or establish its underwriting standards, the realized losses in every
period contain information about the value m. Note that from the point of view of the
reinsurer m is a random variable, noted m ~, such that
e + m = ~ ~ ~
X .
If total losses of Xt are observed at date t, the reinsurer’s belief about m are updated using
Bayes’ rule. The following lemma describes the reinsurer’s beliefs about the insurer’s
quality after T periods.
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Date T beliefs about the quality of the insurer’s portfolio are simply a weighted sum of
the realization, a, of the initial signal and the history of losses, Xt. Higher realized losses
signal poorer underwriting quality (higher values of m). As long as the reinsurer’s liability
is a non-decreasing function of losses, higher past losses signal higher future losses for
the reinsurer. Therefore, as time passes the ceding company’s past experience allows the
reinsurer to form a more precise opinion of the insurer's quality.
3  The optimal quantity of reinsurance in spot markets
Before analyzing repeated reinsurance purchases, it is useful to consider the optimal
reinsurance arrangement in a single period setting. Suppose that the insurer operates only
for one period and is liquidated at date 1 after all claims have been settled. In this setting
the Pareto optimal (first-best) quantity of reinsurance s minimizes the total expected cost
of bankruptcy for both the insurer and reinsurer:



















The simplest risk-sharing contract shifts an ex-ante agreed-upon part of the insurer's
losses at date 1 to the reinsurer in exchange for a premium paid at date 0, a fixed pricing
scheme. However, the market will not achieve the first best because of the information
asymmetry that is an integral part of the reinsurer contract ex ante. In fact in this setting
because bankruptcy costs are non-linear, reinsurers are effectively risk-averse and charge
an additional premium for the noise contained in their information. This can be seen from
the expression for p. In this case, given that the reinsurance market is priced at the zero
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The reinsurance premium is proportional to both the riskiness of the primary insurer’s
policies and the noisiness of the reinsurer’s signal.
The insurer's problem is to select the optimal quantity of reinsurance given the
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The optimal quantity of reinsurance that results from this optimization can be written as
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At this level the insurer's total expected profit can be expressed as
) 2 ( ) (




2 2 2 2
2
0
2 2 2 2
s + m + s + m + s
s + m + s m + s





Comparative static analysis of these results has some interesting implications. First,
simple algebra shows that the insurer's expected cash flow increases with the accuracy of










). The more accurate the reinsurer’s signal,
the lower the reinsurance premium and the higher the ceding company's expected profit.
Second, another point worth mentioning is that the quantity of reinsurance is lower than9
the first-best level. The reason for this under-purchase of reinsurance is that the insurer
must trade-off two risks in determining the optimal quantity of coverage: the original risk
of insolvency and the excess price that results from the reinsurer's noisy information.
Although the insurer is made better off by reinsurance, the asymmetry of information
between insurers and reinsurer limits risk-sharing opportunities between the two agents.
This situation can be improved upon, even in a spot market. Imagine for instance that the
two parties can contract on ex-post adjustments to the original agreement. More
specifically, assume that the reinsurer is allowed to adjust the original premium ex-post
by incorporating the new information contained in the realized losses at date 1. This is
equivalent to offering rebates or commissions as a function of losses, a feature common
to the institutional structure of the reinsurance market.
1 If this ex-post repricing of the
reinsurance is unconstrained, then this contingent pricing mechanism allows the reinsurer
































X E s .
In this case the combination of both ex ante and ex-post pricing makes the contract
equivalent to a contingent pricing mechanism which results in the following lemma.
LEMMA 2:    With the ex post adjustment in ex ante fixed cost pricing 0 ) (
0
= p D E .
Proof:  See appendix.
This premium structure effectively insures that reinsurance pricing incorporates the
information obtained from the current period insurance coverage, and with a competitive
reinsurance market, zero expected profit is achieved.
Assume that the latter pricing mechanism is in place. In this case, the adjustment in the
period one premium can be deducted from (or added to depending on the case) the
reinsurer's part of the total losses at date 1. In this case at date 1, after observing the
realized losses, the reinsurer's evaluation of the insurer's riskiness becomes
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1 See Ferguson (1980)10
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Then the optimal quantity of reinsurance and the insurer's cash flow become respectively
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It easy to see that contingent pricing has improved the insurer's total cash flow compared
to the ex ante fixed price contract. This improvement obtains because, in effect,
contingent pricing makes the effective premium contingent upon more accurate
information: the total premium is based not only on the reinsurer's initial assessment of
the insurer's exposure to catastrophic events, but also on the information conveyed by the
actual realized losses. The concomitant decrease in the noisiness of the reinsurer's
information results in a lower total premium. A by-product of more accurate pricing is
that the quantity of reinsurance purchased is higher with contingent than with fixed
pricing. However, this quantity is still lower than the first-best. The proposition below
summarizes the analysis.
PROPOSITION 1: In the spot market for reinsurance:
a) the quantity of reinsurance traded with contingent pricing is larger than the quantity
traded with fixed pricing but smaller than the efficient quantity of reinsurance
(
f c s s s > > );
b) the quantity of reinsurance traded with any type of contract increases as the
noisiness of the reinsurer’s information declines;
c) the insurer prefers contingent pricing to fixed pricing and its expected profit
increases with the accuracy of the reinsurer’s signal.11
However, contingent pricing is not always feasible in spot markets for three reasons.
First, in many tax jurisdictions such ex post state contingent pricing would be viewed as
not satisfying the requirements of real insurance. This would have devastating effects on
the net cost of such contract premia, and make the arrangement non-economic. Second, in
spot markets the insurer’s wealth or available surplus (which is represented by P in the
model)  effectively bounds the magnitude of ex-post adjustments to the reinsurance
premium. Thus, in order to be feasible contingent pricing schemes may need to be
accompanied by some complementary intertemporal smoothing mechanism. Third, even
when wealth is not a binding constraint, contingent pricing is possible in spot markets
only to the extent that explicit contracts can be written. In practice, this is not always the
case because contrary to what is assumed in this stylized model, losses for a period are
not always observed immediately at the end of the period. Claims are usually filed and
settled gradually. In fact, both insurers and reinsurers may not really know the extent of
their liabilities for past periods before several years elapse. In this context the insurer may
have an incentive to behave dishonestly or to take advantage of the reinsurer. However,
all of these issues can be dealt with in the context of the long-term relationships that are
part of the reinsurance markets operating structure. It is to this structure that we now turn.
4  Infinitely repeated risk-trading and the optimal quantity of reinsurance
The fact that contingent pricing is more efficient than fixed pricing is not surprising
because contingent pricing allows the price to reflect information as it arrives. In short, it
improves the quality of the decisions that agents make. The efficiency of ex-post
adjustments to the reinsurance premium also suggests that if these adjustments are
repeated over time, the insurer might be made even better off without any adverse
consequences for the reinsurer. In other words, in a repeated setting, the first-best Pareto
optimal allocation of risk may be attainable. The purpose of this section is to investigate
this possibility.
Suppose for instance that a primary insurer enters into a long-term relationship with a
reinsurer. Here, long-term means an infinite number of periods. Suppose that when the
ceding company buys reinsurance at date t (which cover losses for period t+1) the insurer
















Then, at each successive date thereafter the insurer is charged an adjustment in addition
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This equality results from the well-known fact that beliefs follow a martingale, that is any
expected change in tomorrow’s beliefs is reflected in today’s beliefs (see the proof of
Lemma 2). Notice that at any date t+j the total premium, including all successive
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This result is important. It indicates that the price of past transactions is constantly being
revised to include new information as it arrives. In fact, at any date t+j the total cost of
the reinsurance that was purchased at date t is equal to the expected cost to the reinsurer
taking into account the information that arrived between dates t and t+j. In effect, this
scheme progressively reduces the noisiness of the reinsurer’s information.




































In the limit, the total reinsurance premium paid by the insurer is equal to the full
information premium that would have been paid if there were no information asymmetry
between insurer and reinsurer. The insurer’s total expected cash flows for insurance and
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The solution to that problem is obviously s , the efficient quantity of reinsurance. This
discussion is summarized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2: In an infinitely lived reinsurance relationship even with asymmetric
information, contingent pricing achieves the Pareto optimal allocation of risk.
5 Finitely repeated risk-trading
The previous section assumes that firms live forever and can enter into infinitely lived
relationships. This assumption is unrealistic for several reasons. First, firms do not last
forever and under some conditions are liquidated. Liquidation of one of the parties
effectively terminates the reinsurance relationship. Second, an insurer may have an
incentive to terminate the relationship after large unexpected losses because of the
resulting future loss of ceding commission if it stays in the relationship. This is
particularly relevant if contracts of infinite duration cannot be written or enforced.
Moreover, reputation mechanisms may not fully mitigate the effects of the
incompleteness of contracts. The reason is that when an insurer experiences extreme
losses as in the case of catastrophic events, the value of maintaining a reputation
decreases.
In a more realistic environment, firms expect the relationship to last a finite number of
periods. Therefore, this section analyses risk-sharing in a simple T-period framework. In
this case it is assumed that the ceding company decides on how much reinsurance to buy
at date 0 for the entire period 0 to T. This assumption is meant to capture the fact that in
the short run, the primary insurer cannot always change its implicit agreement with the
reinsurer or switch reinsurers after a poor loss experience without incurring a reputation
penalty.
1 The respective total cash flows of the insurer and the reinsurer over the finite



































In these expressions pT represents total premia and adjustments paid over the T periods.
                                                       
1 See Gilliam (1980)14
5.1  Contingent pricing
In a finite period relationship, the total price that is paid by the primary insurer is the
expected cost to the reinsurer given the reinsurer’s total information set gathered over the
entire period i = 1…T.  More specifically, the reinsurer’s revised expected cost of



























The term in the expectation bracket corresponds to total bankruptcy costs over the T
periods. Using the Bayesian updating formulas of section 2.4 above, we have
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Therefore at date T, the reinsurer’s revised total expected premium over the T periods is
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With contingent pricing, the ceding company expects to pay only this revised cost











2 2 ( T T a sT E
s R
.
Notice that this cost is higher than the real (full-information) expected cost of bankruptcy.
The difference is due to the noise in the reinsurer’s information set as represented by aT.
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The optimal quantity of reinsurance, s, solves:
) ( max F E
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.
The first and second order conditions for this problem are15
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Therefore the optimal value of s noted 
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T s  exists and is unique:
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Straightforward algebra shows that  s sT <
















This simply means that as the longer the insurer-reinsurer relationship is expected to last,
the larger the quantity of reinsurance traded.
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A straightforward application of the envelope theorem shows that:
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This confirms the intuition that the equilibrium profit of the ceding company is inversely










 This analysis is summarized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3: In a finitely lived reinsurance relationship, under contingent pricing
the quantity of reinsurance is lower than the Pareto optimal level ( s sT <
* ).
As the length of the relationship increases:






















5.2  Fixed Pricing
An alternative to contingent pricing is for the insurer and the reinsurer to sign a long-term
contract for T periods in which the price of reinsurance is fixed once and for all at date 0.
Let pT be the total premium under that contract. Because competition is assumed in the
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In this case by construction, the reinsurer cannot include the new information it learns at
subsequent dates  in the pricing of reinsurance.  From the ceding company’s perspective,

















Comparison with the expressions obtained in the previous section shows that the total
expected premium is higher under fixed pricing than under contingent pricing. The two
expressions are almost identical except for the last term. The difference is due to the
lower noise in the contingent pricing scheme which decreases the last term.17
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Following a procedure similar to the one outlined in the previous section yields the
unique optimal quantity of reinsurance which is given by the expression
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As could be expected 
*
T T s s < , that is insurers purchase more reinsurance under the
contingent pricing scheme than under the fixed-price contract.  Furthermore, the quantity
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It is straightforward to show that this is lower than with contingent pricing, that is
) ( ) (
*
T T E E F < F . The results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4:  Under fixed pricing in a finitely lived reinsurance relationship, both
the quantity of reinsurance and the ceding company’s total expected profit are lower than
the corresponding contingent pricing levels ( s s s T T < <
*  and  ) ( ) (
*
T T E E F < F ). The
quantity of reinsurance is independent of the length of the relationship.
In a fixed price contract the price depends only on the initial information of the reinsurer.
This is noisier than the information that is accumulated over T periods which determines
the price under a contingent pricing contract.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed a model of the role of private reinsurance contracts in
allocating the losses from random property and casualty losses among insurers. First, it
generally explains how information problems affect the efficiency of the allocation of
risk between insurer and reinsurer. Here is demonstrated that the traditional results
obtained from standard models of reinsurance omit relevant, indeed important, aspects of18
the market.  Specifically, traditional models from Borch to the present omit the
information asymmetry prevalent in this market and the intertemporal nature of these
contracts.  Adding these characteristics substantially alters both the nature of the problem
and the design of optimal contracts.  Second, the paper explains the rationale for the
commission structure that prevails in the industry in which the ceding commission is
usually adjusted according to realized losses. Long-term implicit contracts between
insurers and reinsurers allow the inclusion of new information in the pricing of both
future and past reinsurance coverage. When the effective price of reinsurance for one
specific period is contingent upon the outcome in all subsequent periods, the price of
reinsurance is likely to reflect more accurately the underlying risk. Because of this, the
ceding company purchases a more efficient quantity of reinsurance. Specifically, such
arrangements lead to more reinsurance coverage, higher insurer profits, and lower
expected distress in the industry.  The conclusion is that in an environment characterized
by imperfect information and in which learning occurs over time, adjustments of the
reinsurance premium allows insurers to diversify informational risk intertemporally, and
improve social welfare.  It is, in short, Pareto improving.
Finally, the paper also shows the limitations of the rebate structure. Most of the analysis
rests on the implicit assumption that the pooled capacity of insurer and reinsurer is large
enough to allow for full settlement every period. To the extent that the realized outcome
falls within reasonable bounds this scheme works. However, in extreme cases the scheme
falls apart and crises occur. In particular, when both insurer and reinsurer are susceptible
to the same aggregate shocks, they may be unable to fulfill their commitments to each
other in case of extremely high losses. This suggests that risk-sharing mechanisms that
pool capacity within the insurance industry have their limitations and that there is a role
for the broader capital markets in the effective mitigation of catastrophic risks. Whether
markets can improve the intertemporal smoothing ability of private reinsurance contracts
is left for further research.19
Appendix
A- PROOF OF LEMMA 1




























































The proof consists of two parts: first we show that the lemma holds for T=1; second we
show that if the lemma is true for any T, it must also hold for T+1.
a) The lemma is true for T=1.
At date 0 the reinsurer’s beliefs can be expressed as:
0
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where a is the realization of a ~ . The reinsurer’s beliefs at date 1, can be computed with
Bayes’ formula above as:
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The same result is obtained by replacing T by 1 in the lemma an recognizing that
l =
1
a l - =1
1
b .
b) If the lemma is true for any T, then it must also be true for T+1.
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This is the same as replacing T by T+1 in the lemma.
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